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ABSTRACT 
 
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative, longitudinal 
survey, this study examines changing levels of Unemployment Insurance (UI) eligibility and benefit 
receipt among working low-educated single mothers, 1990–2005. It also examines changing participation 
in cash welfare and the Food Stamp Program (FSP). Relative to single childless women, there has been no 
increase in UI benefit receipt among single mothers entering a spell of unemployment in the postreform 
period, even though single mothers have increased their relative rates of UI eligibility. Because of 
declining cash assistance receipt, UI became a more common income support than cash assistance for this 
population during the period 2001–2005. Furthermore, the probability of accessing FSP for low-educated 
single mothers entering a spell of unemployment increased in the years 2001–2005. As a result, the 
proportion of this population accessing benefits from one or more of these programs remained virtually 
unchanged across the study period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, low-educated single mothers left cash welfare and increased their labor 
force participation at unprecedented rates (Blank 2006). A number of factors contributed to these 
dramatic changes: the 1996 welfare reform, the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), and the economic expansion of the late 1990s (Ellwood 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum 
2001). An important question is the extent to which increased work effort by low-educated single 
mothers who experience job loss has translated into increased access to unemployment insurance 
(UI). 
UI is the major social insurance program in the United States protecting against lost 
income incurred during unemployment. However, existing literature finds that low-wage workers 
often experience difficulties accessing the program (Levine 2006; Shaefer 2010; Vroman 1998; 
Wenger 2006). This study explores the extent to which UI utilization patterns of low-educated 
single working mothers entering a spell of unemployment have changed during the postwelfare 
reform era, relative to patterns in the prereform era. In addition, we examine changes in 
utilization of two major income support programs that may be important to this population: cash 
welfare and the Food Stamp Program (FSP, now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, SNAP). 
This study addresses three questions:  
1) Has the large growth in labor force participation among adult single mothers since the 
early 1990s been accompanied by a growth in UI participation by this population when they 
experience a spell of unemployment? 
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2) Has eligibility for UI changed over time for this group, and are nonmonetary or 
monetary eligibility requirements more important? 
3) Has the relative importance of three major income support programs—UI, FSP, and 
cash welfare—changed for single mothers who enter a spell of unemployment? 
In most descriptive and multivariate analyses, we compare program participation 
outcomes for low-educated single mothers to those of low-educated single childless women. We 
do this to control for competing explanatory factors that would have affected low-educated 
single mothers and low-educated single childless women similarly, in an effort to evaluate 
whether any changes in the UI participation of single mothers might be attributed to welfare 
reform and changes in related social welfare policies (Ellwood 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum 
2001; Meyer and Sullivan 2004). 
Relative to single childless women, our results suggest there has been no increase in UI 
benefit receipt among single mothers who enter a spell of unemployment in the postreform 
period. This is despite the fact that single mothers appear to have improved their likelihood of 
meeting monetary and nonmonetary eligibility requirements for UI, relative to single childless 
women. Because cash assistance has declined precipitously, however, UI has for the first time 
become a more common income support than cash assistance for single mothers entering a spell 
of unemployment. While we find that cash assistance receipt among this population declined 
over the study period, the proportion accessing the Food Stamp Program increased, to the extent 
that the proportion of single mothers accessing some form of benefits from one of these three 
programs stayed virtually constant across the study period. 
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Background and Contribution 
Most research on participation in UI by vulnerable workers explores the importance of 
three key factors: 1) monetary eligibility, 2) nonmonetary eligibility, and 3) take-up of benefits 
(Bassi and McMurrer 1997; Levine 2006; O’Leary and Kline 2008; Vroman 2009). Each of 
these factors has been cited as a barrier to benefit receipt. 
Monetary eligibility generally requires a state-specific minimum of earnings from any 
qualifying employer. These requirements vary, but they generally fall between $1,000 and 
$3,000 earned over four quarters. Many states also have a high quarter requirement, with a 
minimum requirement within a single quarter. Until recently, the base period used by most states 
to determine eligibility included earnings in the first four of the previous five completed quarters, 
which caused long lags between job loss and the earnings that could be included in eligibility 
calculations. A growing number of states have adopted Alternative Base Periods (ABPs), which 
allow workers to include earnings from their most recently completed quarter, thus increasing the 
chances that low-wage workers (who often have shorter work histories) would meet monetary 
requirements (Boushey and Wenger 2006; Wenger 2006).1
Most nonmonetary requirements relate to the circumstances surrounding a worker’s job 
separation, including the reason for job loss and availability for future employment. To be 
eligible, workers typically must have left employment because of layoff, plant closing, or some 
 Some recent studies, however, find 
that vulnerable workers already have high rates of monetary eligibility (O’Leary and Kline 2008; 
Rangarajan and Razafindrakoto 2004; Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson 2002; Shaefer 
2010). High levels of monetary eligibility among vulnerable populations suggest that this is not 
the primary factor driving low levels of UI participation. 
                                                 
1 Many of these states adopted an ABP in response to monetary incentives included in the recent American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). 
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other involuntary reason, without cause, and be looking for work. In a few states, workers who 
do not initially meet nonmonetary requirements may later become eligible. Further, some states 
have provisions that allow workers who voluntarily quit for good cause to maintain eligibility 
(such as care for a family member, child care difficulties, trailing spouse provisions, and 
domestic violence provisions). A number of existing studies suggest that nonmonetary 
requirements may be the more important eligibility barrier to UI access facing vulnerable 
workers (Holzer 2000; O’Leary and Kline 2008; Rangarajan and Razaﬁndrakoto 2004; 
Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson 2002). High rates of nonmonetary ineligibility among 
vulnerable workers may be due in part to the characteristics of the industries in which they are 
clustered. Low-wage workers are disproportionately employed in industries that tend to avoid 
formal layoffs (General Accounting Office 2000; Lambert 2008). 
A final factor affecting access to UI is benefits take-up. Vulnerable unemployed workers 
who are eligible for UI may be less likely to take up UI benefits as compared to more-
advantaged eligible unemployed workers. Using the 2001 panel of the SIPP, Shaefer (2010) 
found that eligible workers in the lowest wage quintile were less likely to participate in UI than 
higher-paid eligible workers. Using CPS supplements, Wandnerand Stettner (2000)report that 
more than half of the unemployed do not file for unemployment insurance, and that the most 
common reason cited is “perceived ineligibility.”  
Low-Educated Single Mothers, Labor Force Participation, and UI Participation 
 Most studies find that single mothers increased their labor force participation in the 1990s 
in response to a combination of the 1996 welfare reform, expansions of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), increases to the minimum wage, and the booming economy of the 1990s (Blank 
2006; Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish 2009; Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 1995; Eissa and 
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Liebman 1996; Ellwood 2000; Hotz and Scholz 2003; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). The EITC 
expansions and the 1996 welfare reform fundamentally changed antipoverty policy by raising the 
benefits of work while ending an entitlement to cash assistance. 
These changes led to a dramatic decline in the number of single-mother families 
receiving cash assistance. Cash assistance through Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) and then Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) caseloads declined from 
11.5 million individuals in 1990 to just 4.5 million in 2005. What is unknown is whether single 
mothers entering a spell of unemployment experienced growing access to UI during this period. 
Did cash assistance previously act as “UI for low-educated single mothers”? If so, has it stopped 
serving this function? Most importantly, if single mothers entering a spell of unemployment saw 
declining access to cash assistance over the period 1990–2005, did their probability of accessing 
UI increase?  
 Isaacs (2005) uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) data to show that the proportion 
of all low-income single female household heads with related resident children who received UI 
grew during the early recession years of 2001–2003, beyond the increase in participation rates 
during the recession of the early 1990s. She concludes that this growth in UI participation at least 
in part explains why TANF rolls continued to fall during the 2001 recession. However, she does 
not examine the participation rates of single mothers entering a spell of unemployment, nor does 
she use a comparison group to rule out the importance of other factors besides the major social 
policy changes. 
In a study using recent administrative data from four major states, O’Leary and Kline 
(2008) find that 90 percent of welfare (TANF) leavers who left TANF for employment and then 
lost a job and applied for UI were monetarily eligible. Welfare leavers in these states, however, 
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were far less likely to meet nonmonetary eligibility requirements than other applicants, which the 
authors attribute to higher rates of voluntary job quits and dismissals. Two other studies of 
TANF leavers find that a large majority of former welfare recipients met monetary requirements, 
and that nonmonetary requirements were again the greater eligibility barrier (Rangarajan and 
Razaﬁndrakoto 2004; Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson 2002). These studies examine 
relatively short study periods and do not utilize nationally representative samples. 
Boushey and Wenger (2006) use SIPP data to examine the monetary eligibility of recent 
welfare recipients who transitioned to work, pre- and postwelfare reform. They find that recent 
welfare leavers were less likely to meet monetary requirements in the late 1990s than they were 
in the early 1990s. They do not, however, look at other key outcomes of UI benefit receipt or 
nonmonetary eligibility, nor do they use a comparison group. Furthermore, while examining 
recent welfare leavers offers important information, it is important to examine the broader 
sample of single mothers, not just recent welfare recipients, because there have been large 
compositional changes in the makeup of welfare leavers across time (Meyer and Sullivan 2004).2
Contribution of the Current Study 
 
These selection effects may affect estimates in important ways. It is also important to explore 
changes in outcomes relative to a comparison group, in an effort to control for other factors. 
To our knowledge, the current study is the first to look at changes in both UI benefit 
receipt and UI eligibility using a nationally representative longitudinal sample of low-educated 
single mothers at the point that they enter a spell of unemployment during the period 1990–2005. 
This period includes the 1996 welfare reform, the major EITC expansions, two recessions, and 
                                                 
2 A single mother who received cash assistance in the early 1990s may have never received benefits in the 
postreform era. On the other hand, the same woman who left welfare postreform may have never left during the 
early 1990s. 
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two economic expansions of varying sizes. We also believe that this is the first study to examine 
the changing importance of UI utilization relative to that in two major income support 
programs—1) AFDC/TANF and 2) the Food Stamp Program (FSP, now the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP). 
We hypothesize that single mothers entering a spell of unemployment will experience a 
relative increase in eligibility and UI benefit receipt in the postwelfare reform period, spurred by 
increasing labor force participation and declining access to cash welfare (Holzer 2000; Isaacs 
2005). However, we further hypothesize that, as a result of declines in cash assistance, the 
probability of accessing any safety-net support will decline postreform. 
DATA AND METHODS 
This study utilizes the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), collected by 
the U.S. Census Bureau, which offers a longitudinal representation of the civilian 
noninstitutionalized population in the United States. The survey selects a nationally 
representative sample by clustering addresses within cities and counties based on population 
counts from the most recent decennial census. Interviews are conducted every four months about 
each individual in the household for each intervening month, gathering data on demographics, 
income sources, welfare, household and family structure, and jobs and work history. A recent 
comparative analysis of eight major nationally representative surveys that measure income and 
program participation finds that SIPP does a superior job of measuring the income of poor 
households and measuring public program participation (Czajka and Denmead 2008).3
                                                 
3 Despite SIPP’s relative strength in measuring program participation, Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan  (2009) 
find that the survey still suffers from underreporting of public program benefit receipt and the amount of benefits. 
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For the current analyses, we pooled data from the 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 
and 2004 SIPP panels to create a sample with data from the start of 1990 through the end of 
2005, with short gaps only in 1995 and 2000 between SIPP panels. The 1990–1993 panels were 
typically two years long and overlapped. Later panels were three to four years long and did not 
overlap. All analyses use person-month weights. Standard errors are clustered to account for 
multiple observations per respondent. A few small states are not uniquely identifiable in the 2001 
and older panels. As is common with SIPP studies, we drop observations from these states, 
because we cannot match them with state program eligibility rules (Gruber and Simon 2008).  
We define our study population as working-age single mothers, ages 22–55, with minor 
children, who have a high school degree or less.4
Identifying Job Separations in SIPP 
 Our comparison group is similarly educated 
single childless women in the same age range. In most analyses, we compare the relative 
outcomes of these two groups across time because these two populations experience similar 
dynamics in the labor market but are differentially affected by welfare reform and other policy 
changes. By comparing low-educated single mothers to low-educated single childless women, 
we hope to control for external factors leading to changes in program participation and eligibility 
that are not unique to single mothers (Ellwood 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Meyer and 
Sullivan 2004). 
Most analyses in this paper examine workers at the point that they enter a spell of 
unemployment. A respondent is considered to have entered a spell of unemployment if she was 
                                                                                                                                                             
While this presents a limitation to our work, we believe that it highlights one of the strengths of relying on a 
comparison population, as it is unlikely that rates of underreporting for single mothers and single childless women 
differ systematically over time. 
4 We take marital status and education at time t, the point at which they enter a spell of unemployment. We 
explore the importance of a recent marital separation in the sensitivity analysis section. 
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employed and working during month t – 1 and not working but seeking work in month t. A 
respondent is considered to have transitioned out of the labor force if she was working in month  
t – 1 and not working and not seeking work in month t.  (These guidelines are adapted from 
official definitions used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics [2007].) These categorizations are 
fairly stable during the months following job loss. Based on these restrictions, our sample 
includes 49,354 person-year observations of low-educated single women. We have 4,412 person-
month observations in which low-educated single women go from working in t – 1 to not 
working but seeking work in t.5
Table 1 compares demographic attributes for single mothers and single childless women 
in the prereform years (1990–1994) and the postreform years (2001–2005) under study. This 
shows that the Hispanic ethnicity, age, and education characteristics of low-educated single 
mothers stayed relatively constant in comparison to low-educated single childless women. It 
does appear that single childless women were more likely to be nonwhite in the postreform 
period, relative to single mothers (making race an important control variable in later multivariate 
models). As would be expected, the proportion of single mothers who work rises considerably 
relative to the proportion of single childless women who work—an 11.8-percentage-point 
increase for the former, compared to a 6.2-percentage-point decline for the latter (for a total 
relative change between the two groups of 18 percentage points). 
 This includes some respondents who experience multiple 
transitions during a panel. 
                                                 
5 For some analyses of transitions across months in SIPP, there would be concern that imputation might 
lead to a false transition. However, labor market variables in SIPP are imputed by taking the respondent’s previous 
month’s values, so in this case imputation would not cause such a transition. 
10 
Estimating UI Participation and Eligibility 
UI participation. A respondent is considered to have participated in UI if she reported 
cash benefit receipt from a state unemployment insurance program during the first three months 
following a job separation (two-, four-, and five-month lagged variables were explored, but none 
substantively changed the results). This lagged variable is necessary because considerable time 
can elapse between job loss and benefit receipt. Workers may be on layoff waiting to be called 
back, or they may explore other employment options before turning to UI. Also, most state 
programs required one-week waiting periods before granting benefits. 
Monetary eligibility. SIPP includes monthly data on earnings. Monetary eligibility 
requirements by state-year were drawn from annual comparisons of state program laws provided 
by the Department of Labor, and merged with the SIPP data by state-year. To estimate monetary 
eligibility, each worker’s wages were run through a simulation comparing her earnings over one 
year to her state’s minimum base period and high quarter (if applicable) requirements for that 
year. The three months directly preceding the employment separation were omitted to mirror the 
period that would typically be excluded by states prior to adoption of ABPs. Although this does 
not coincide exactly with the worker’s official base period, it is a close approximation. Earnings 
from work were included for the 12 prior months, stretching back 15 months prior to the 
employment separation. The sample base for estimating monetary eligibility is restricted to 
workers in the sample for five or more months prior to employment separation. This may lead to 
an upward bias in eligibility due to nonrandom attrition (workers who are most likely not to meet 
these requirements may be most likely to leave the SIPP sample early). However, this bias is 
likely similar for mothers and childless women within panels, so it should not affect relative 
comparisons. A worker was considered to meet her state’s monetary requirements if her earnings 
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in the simulated base period and her high quarter earnings were at or above her state’s minimum 
requirements. 
Nonmonetary eligibility. Initial nonmonetary eligibility requirements related to 
employment separations also vary by state, but they are often generalized in studies of nationally 
representative microdata (Levine 2006). For this study, a respondent is considered to have met 
initial nonmonetary requirements if the unemployment spell began because the worker “lost a 
job or was laid off” (Levine 2006). The respondent is considered ineligible if she left a position 
because of a discharge for cause or a voluntary quit. Because of difficulties with the time frame 
(person-month observations), responses on this measure are available for only a portion of the 
total sample used for other estimates. To ensure that this does not bias the results, we ran all 
descriptive and regression estimates, restricting them to this smaller subsample, and these results 
proved substantively similar. Another concern is that some respondents may choose not to self-
report discharge or firing. This means that estimates from the SIPP may somewhat overestimate 
nonmonetary eligibility. However, those who are discharged or fired are likely to report a 
voluntary quit instead, which would also lead to the respondent being coded as nonmonetarily 
ineligible. Thus the bias is likely small, if it exists at all.  
An important limitation of this method is that it will lead some workers to be coded as 
ineligible who meet the voluntary quits provisions employed by some states discussed above. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to adequately account for this in nationally representative 
estimates using survey microdata, given the complexity of state rules. Thus, similar studies use 
the standardized decision rules employed here (Levine 2006). 
For ease of interpretation, in both descriptive and multivariate models we cluster the 
years into three period dummy variables: prereform (1990–1994), reform implementation (1996–
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1999), and postreform (2001–2005). The years 1995 and 2000 are omitted from all analyses 
because of breaks in the SIPP panels. Clustering into three periods does not substantively change 
our findings. The periods 1990–1994 and 2001–2005 provide particularly useful comparison 
periods, as both included a mild recession and some expansionary years. The period 1996–1999 
was quite anomalous because it occurred during an economic boom, and states implemented 
their TANF programs at different times following the 1996 reform. Thus, we focus our analyses 
on comparisons of outcomes in the prereform period and the postreform period. 
Multivariate Method 
For multivariate analyses, we use an approach that is similar to that employed by Meyer 
and Rosenbaum (2001) and Meyer and Sullivan (2004). We restrict our sample to low-educated 
single mothers and low-educated single childless women in the same age range, focusing on the 
relative outcomes between these two groups, which face similar conditions in the labor market. 
Our baseline specification is as follows: 
t,j,it,j,it,j,it,j,it,j,int,j,i )period*glemothersin(periodXUI ελφβ +++=+  . 
The dependent variables for most model variations are dichotomous lagged outcome 
measures where 1 = UI benefit receipt or eligibility in month t, t + 1, or t + 2 following job loss 
and 0 = no UI participation or eligibility in t, t + 1, or t + 2 following job loss. X is a vector of 
individual and environmental characteristics taken at time t that include race (white, black, 
other), ethnicity (Hispanic origin = 1), age (in dummy categories for ages 22–30, 31–40, 41–50, 
and 51–55), marital status (never married, divorced, separated, widowed), whether the 
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respondent lives in a metropolitan area, education (high school graduate = 1), the state-month 
unemployment rate, and state fixed effects.6
Each model includes a series of interacted single mother * period dummy variables. 
These interacted terms represent the relative difference in the probability of the dependent 
outcome between the comparison group (low-educated single childless women) and the 
treatment group (low-educated single mothers), after controlling for other factors in the model. 
The effect size is calculated by subtracting the point estimate associated with the single mother * 
postreform term by the point estimate associated with the single mother * prereform term, to 
show the relative change in the difference between the two groups between periods. We test the 
statistical significance of the difference between these point estimates with a test of linear 
restrictions. The p-values for these tests are reported for all models. 
  
We use linear probability (LP) models because the interpretation of an interaction 
between two variables is straightforward in linear models. In contrast, the “interaction effect in 
nonlinear models [probit or logit models] does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction 
term, can be of opposite sign, and its statistical significance is not calculated by standard 
software” (Ai and Norton 2003, p.123).Thus, while probit or logit specifications are generally 
preferable for models with dichotomous outcomes, in this case an LP approach is more 
appropriate. 
                                                 
6 In sensitivity analyses we run alternative models that account for a recent divorce or separation, long-term 
labor-force attachment, industry, and household headship. We run models using region fixed effects rather than 
state. We also run models 1) restricting our models to job losers and 2) broadening our models to all respondents 
who go from working to not working. While some of these do change the point estimates slightly, they do not 
change our interpretation of the results. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive results 
Table 2 compares UI participation and eligibility outcomes for low-educated single 
mothers to those of low-educated childless women. The top panel reports on the proportion of 
low-educated single mothers (column 1) and childless women (column 2) entering a spell of 
unemployment who access UI cash benefits, by period. Column 3 reports the difference in 
outcomes between these two groups for each period (column 1 – column 2), along with 
associated standard errors.7
The top panel of column 1 reports that the proportion of single mothers entering a spell of 
unemployment who reported UI receipt fell over the three time periods: from 28.7 percent in the 
years 1990–1994 to 21.4 percent in the years 2001–2005. Single childless women, though, 
experienced a similar drop (from 31.4 to 25.5 percent), so the difference in outcomes between 
the two groups stayed virtually the same across the three time periods, changing by a statistically 
insignificant 1.4 percentage points from 1990–1994 to 2001–2005. Contrary to our hypothesis, 
these estimates suggest that single mothers experiencing a spell of unemployment did not 
improve their probability of accessing UI benefits upon entering a spell of unemployment. 
 
The next panel reports on monetary eligibility rates for single mothers and single 
childless women over the three study periods.8
                                                 
7 Standard errors of the differences use the form for standard errors for the difference between two large 
and independent random samples, which generates wider standard errors than some alternative measures. 
 While single mothers did not improve their 
probability of accessing benefits, we do find that low-educated single mothers experiencing a 
spell of unemployment improved their rates of monetary eligibility across the three time periods. 
8 Our estimates of both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility are quite similar to existing estimates for 
similar although not identical populations and study periods (Kaye 1997; Rangarajan and Razaﬁndrakoto 2004; 
Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson 2002). 
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Whereas 71.5 percent of this group was eligible for UI during the period 1990–1994, a 
statistically significantly different 76.9 percent was eligible during the postreform period of 
2001–2005. Across the three periods, the monetary eligibility rates of single childless women 
stayed roughly constant (84.2 percent prereform and 82.6 percent postreform). Therefore, single 
mothers improved their relative probability of meeting monetary requirements by a statistically 
significant 7 percentage points between the periods 1990–1994 and 2001–2005. 
 The following panel tracks nonmonetary eligibility across the three time periods. As 
expected, rates of nonmonetary eligibility are far lower than rates of monetary eligibility across 
both groups of low-educated single women. While 40.0 percent of low-educated single mothers 
experiencing a spell of unemployment were nonmonetarily eligible during the prereform period, 
38.7 percent met these requirements in the postreform period. During the same period, though, 
low-educated single childless women saw a 9.4-percentage-point drop in their nonmonetary 
eligibility (from 45.5 percent nonmonetarily eligible to 36.1 percent nonmonetarily eligible), and 
this led to a statistically significant relative improvement in the nonmonetary eligibility of single 
mothers of 8 percentage points. Thus, single mothers improved their eligibility rates, relative to 
single childless women, both in terms of monetary and nonmonetary eligibility. 
 The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the mean benefit amount received by single mothers, 
conditional on UI receipt, adjusted to 1996 dollars. This stayed relatively stable for single 
mothers, going from $516 in 1990–1994 to $504 in 2001–2005. Single childless women saw a 
statistically insignificant increase between these two periods, from $537 to $593. While this led 
to a substantial relative change of –$68, the change was not statistically significant. 
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Multivariate Results 
 Columns 1–3 of Table 3 report on a series of regression models testing the descriptive 
relationships discussed above. Note that the interacted terms single mother * time period 
represent the relative difference between mothers and nonmothers in each period, after 
controlling for other factors included in the models. The effect size of interest is the difference 
between the point estimates for the single mother * prereform term and the single mother * 
postreform term. The test of linear restrictions determines whether these point estimates are 
statistically significantly different from each other. The p-value for these tests is presented in 
each column of Table 3. 
 The other covariates suggest that outcomes for this population are consistent with 
findings from existing studies. Older workers are more likely to access UI benefits and to meet 
both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility requirements than younger workers. High school 
graduates are more likely to access benefits and be nonmonetarily eligible, compared to those 
without a high school degree. Union members are 8.1 percentage points more likely to access 
benefits and 5.3 percentage points more likely to be monetarily eligible than nonunion members. 
Very few of the race and ethnicity point estimates are statistically significant. Blacks were 6.1 
percentage points less likely to meet monetary eligibility requirements but no less likely to report 
UI benefit receipt. Interestingly, column 3 suggests low-educated Hispanic single women are 8.3 
percentage points more likely to be nonmonetarily eligible than low-educated non-Hispanic 
single women. 
Column 1 reports on a model predicting UI benefit receipt for low-educated single 
women experiencing a spell of unemployment. Examining the single mother * period interaction 
terms in the first three rows, there are no statistically significant differences in program 
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participation between single mothers and single childless women during the prereform, reform, 
and postreform periods, and none of the interaction terms are statistically significantly different 
from one another. This supports the descriptive finding that single mothers experiencing a spell 
of unemployment did not improve their probability of accessing UI benefits in the period of 
2001–2005, relative to single childless women. 
The next two columns report on models with dichotomous outcomes for monetary 
eligibility (column 2) and nonmonetary eligibility (column 3). According to column 2, low-
educated single mothers experiencing a spell of unemployment went from being a statistically 
significant 12.2 percentage points less likely than similar childless women to meet monetary 
eligibility requirements in 1990–1994 to a statistically insignificant 4.3 percentage points less 
likely in 2001–2005. This represents a relative improvement of 7.9 percentage points, which is 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. After controlling for other factors, column 2 is 
consistent with the descriptive findings that single mothers improved their rates of monetary 
eligibility, relative to single childless women. 
In terms of nonmonetary eligibility, single mothers went from being –0.032 percentage 
points less likely to meet these criteria when compared to single childless women to 5.9 
percentage points more likely to meet them. While the parameter estimates are not statistically 
significant, the test of linear restrictions for these terms yields a statistically significant p-value 
of 0.063. This supports the conclusion that single mothers improved their nonmonetary eligibility 
rates from 1990–1994 to 2001–2005, relative to single childless women. Finally, column 4 
reports on the amount of benefits, conditional on receiving any. This model shows no statistically 
significant change in the average amount of benefits received by single mothers over the three 
time periods. 
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Changing Participation in Other Public Programs Over Time 
We now examine changing participation in two other major income-support programs, 
cash welfare (AFDC and TANF) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP, now SNAP). Cash welfare 
was the primary target of the 1996 welfare reform, so the major changes leading to declines in 
cash assistance caseloads affected low-educated single mothers particularly. FSP has the largest 
caseload of any means-tested income support program in the current decade.9
 Figure 1 plots annual benefit receipt rates for these programs by low-educated single 
mothers entering a spell of unemployment.
 With a caseload of 
25.7 million individuals in 2007, FSP/SNAP served more individuals than TANF (4.5 million), 
UI (7.9 million), and even the EITC (22.8 million) (Scholz, Moffitt, and Cowan 2009). 
10
Between 1990 and 1993, UI benefit receipt rates were nearly identical to AFDC benefit 
receipt rates. AFDC participation rates peaked in 1994 for low-educated single mothers entering 
a spell of unemployment (as is true of the overall program caseloads), and participation in cash 
assistance declined over the next decade. Figure 1 shows that UI benefit receipt among low-
educated single mothers experiencing a spell of unemployment dropped during the reform years 
 During all postreform years (2001–2005), a greater 
proportion of low-educated single mothers entering a spell of unemployment received UI 
benefits than received TANF. This is the first time this was true. In 2002, for example, 16 
percent of single mothers entering a spell of unemployment participated in TANF, whereas 21 
percent participated in UI.  Since 2002, the proportion accessing TANF has shrunk even further, 
and the proportion participating in UI has stayed at or above 16 percent every year. 
                                                 
9 While FSP is officially considered a means-tested program, it is essentially an income support program 
that shifts out the budget constraint of participating families. 
10 We compared these estimates to publicly available caseload data for FSP and AFDC/TANF and found 
that our results for this particular population of recently unemployed single mothers followed a pattern similar to the 
caseload trends in general. 
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as well, as would be expected given the program’s countercyclical design. In 2001, though, as 
the economy entered into a recession followed by a period of less robust economic growth, UI 
eclipsed cash welfare as a more important program for low-educated single mothers entering a 
spell of unemployment. 
 Far more common than either of these programs was receipt of FSP benefits. FSP 
participation grew in the early 1990s and declined significantly during the welfare reform period. 
However, FSP participation rates rose significantly during the postreform period, from 51 
percent of low-educated single mothers entering a spell of unemployment in 2001 to 64 percent 
in 2005, the highest of any year in the study. 
 We return to multivariate results in Table 2, column 5, to examine the probability of 
benefit receipt in one or more programs upon entering a spell of unemployment. After 
controlling for other factors, the probability that a single mother will access at least one of these 
programs is approximately 25 percentage points higher than that of a single childless woman. 
This disparity stays about the same across all three periods studied, despite the precipitous 
decline in the probability of receiving cash assistance. Across all three periods, low-educated 
single mothers entering a spell of unemployment seem to have benefited from an extra layer of 
safety-net protection in the form of cash assistance and FSP benefits, relative to single childless 
women, at least in terms of the probability of benefit receipt during a spell of unemployment. 
The growth in access to the FSP appears to have compensated for the decline in cash assistance, 
at least in terms of the proportion of single mothers accessing benefits. 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
We ran a series of alternative models to assess the robustness of our findings. (All results 
are available upon request.) We added potentially endogenous industry variables, because 
industry has a strong effect on UI eligibility and receipt. Results for our single mother * time 
period point estimates were virtually unchanged, likely because single mothers and single 
childless women are clustered in the same industries. We also restricted our models to household 
heads, since cohabiting single mothers may have access to resources not enjoyed by household 
heads. The results were again substantively similar. We ran models accounting for a recent 
marital status change and long-term labor force attachment, and these did not affect our results 
substantively. 
We wanted to assess the importance of changing patterns of reemployment. Perhaps 
single mothers in the postreform period are more likely to go back to work faster. We found that 
single mothers in the prereform period were a statistically insignificant 2.3 percentage points less 
likely to be reemployed in two months. In the postreform period, they were a statistically 
insignificant 2.4 percentage points more likely to be reemployed. These point estimates are not 
statistically significantly different from each other. Therefore, there is some possibility that 
changes in the probability of becoming reemployed have had an effect on the take-up of UI 
benefits; however, these results are inconclusive. 
We also ran our models on two other groups: first, we restricted it to the population of job 
losers (who by definition meet nonmonetary eligibility requirements), and second, we included a 
broader sample of single women who transitioned from work to not working (and who may not 
be seeking work, a prerequisite of accessing UI). While these alternative samples did lead to 
slight changes in the point estimates of the key interaction terms, the relative changes between 
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periods stayed substantively similar. One exception was among the broader population of single 
women transitioning from work to not working. These single mothers saw their probability of 
accessing one of the three programs fall, relative to single childless women, from about 34 
percentage points higher to 25 percentage points higher. Thus, sample selection may have 
implications for understanding the package of benefits that these families rely on during a spell 
of unemployment. The current study, however, is focused on individuals who remain attached to 
the labor force. 
DISCUSSION 
 Our analyses have a number of limitations. Underreporting of benefits in household 
surveys is a concern (Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2009). Generally, SIPP enjoys higher reporting 
rates than similar household surveys. Still, because underreporting rates in a single survey can 
vary across years and especially panels, this complicates comparisons of annual participation 
rates. Also, certain other factors not related to the social policy changes experienced by single 
mothers may have led to changes over time in UI participation, such as broader labor market 
changes. These concerns highlight the advantages of focusing on relative comparisons of low-
educated single mothers to low-educated single childless women over time, which may mitigate 
concerns about underreporting. 
As with all studies using household survey microdata, this study is limited in its ability to 
accurately model monetary and nonmonetary eligibility. However, the empirical benefit of using 
data from household surveys such as SIPP—even when doing so requires making some 
assumptions—is the ability to examine a nationally representative population over a long period 
of time, which is not possible using administrative data. Also, few, if any, sources of 
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administrative data include information on family composition or education level, key variables 
in the current study (Levine 2006). Our estimates of monetary and nonmonetary eligibility are 
consistent with other studies of similar populations that use a variety of data sources (Kaye 1997; 
Rangarajan and Razaﬁndrakoto 2004; Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson 2002). 
Despite these limitations, this paper offers a number of findings that could be useful in 
examining policy going forward. Relative to single childless women, we find no increase in UI 
benefit receipt among single mothers who enter a spell of unemployment in the postreform 
period, even though single mothers were more likely to be eligible for UI in the postreform 
period, relative to single childless women. Because cash assistance has declined, however, UI is 
now a more common income support than cash assistance. 
While the importance of cash welfare has diminished over this period, the Food Stamp 
Program (now SNAP) has grown in importance. Roughly three-fifths of low-educated single 
mothers entering a spell of unemployment accessed FSP benefits in 2004–2005. Most low-
educated single mothers access at least one of the three programs studied here upon entering a 
spell of unemployment, and they are far more likely to get some form of aid than similarly 
educated single childless women. 
Recent policy efforts to boost the UI participation rates of vulnerable workers have 
focused on reforming UI eligibility rules. Our results lead to the conclusion that reforming 
eligibility requirements may not, in and of itself, significantly increase benefit receipt. While 
single mothers saw both their monetary and nonmonetary eligibility rates improve relative to 
single childless women, they did not see relative improvement in benefit receipt. This may be 
due to a lack of knowledge about the program, a lack of understanding of a complex bureaucratic 
process, a lack of need for benefits (as a result of greater access to the FSP), or a quick transition 
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back to work. Future research should explore this. A few papers find that the main reason that 
individuals fail to apply for UI is that they believe they are ineligible (Vroman 2009; Wandner 
and Stettner 2000). If this is the case, raising the take-up rates of eligible low-educated workers 
may require a public information campaign to raise awareness of possible eligibility. 
To the extent that eligibility criteria act as a barrier to UI for this population, we find that 
nonmonetary requirements are a greater barrier than monetary requirements. However, reforming 
nonmonetary requirements involves issues of moral hazard—making UI benefits available to 
individuals who quit their jobs would incentivize them to do so. Some might argue that low rates 
of nonmonetary eligibility result from personal characteristics of low-educated single working 
mothers, who may not have the skills necessary to maintain employment. If this were accurate, 
the best way to increase UI receipt would be through stronger job training programs for low-
skilled workers. Because low-educated single mothers access UI benefits at rates that are 
comparable to low-educated single childless women, such a campaign might benefit all low-
educated workers. 
Two things call this individual-level interpretation into question, though. First, the 
historical purpose of UI monetary eligibility rates has been to determine whether a worker has 
sufficient labor force attachment to merit access to UI benefits. As evidenced here, most working 
single mothers who fall into unemployment meet these thresholds, suggesting substantial 
attachment to the labor force. Second, low levels of nonmonetary eligibility are highly associated 
with the industries in which single mothers are clustered (General Accounting Office 2000). 
These industries avoid formal layoffs, utilizing changes in work hours and other methods that 
can often cause a worker to quit (Lambert 2008). 
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Thus, policymakers are left with a paradox. Liberalizing nonmonetary eligibility limits 
may weaken the UI system by marginalizing its status as social insurance. However, not 
liberalizing them may leave low-educated workers with substantial labor force attachment out of 
the UI system. How might policymakers begin to address this? A first step would be to examine 
the nonmonetary eligibility rules of other western industrial counterparts, many of whom limit 
nonmonetary ineligibility to a few weeks or months instead of the unemployment spell duration 
(Storey and Neisner 1997). While the policy prescriptions in this area may not be clear at this 
point in time, it is incumbent upon policymakers to at least consider how these requirements 
might be reshaped, if UI is to effectively act as social insurance for low-educated workers with 
substantial labor force attachment in the twenty-first century. 
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Table 1  Characteristics of Low-Educated Single Women Ages 22–55, Pre- and Postreform 
 
Means 
 
Single mothers  Single women, no children 
Prereform 
(1990–94) 
Postreform 
(2001–03) 
 Prereform 
(1990–94) 
Postreform 
(2001–03) 
Race and ethnicity      
White, non-Hispanic 0.583 0.588  0.764 0.696 
Non-white 0.384 0.363  0.233 0.278 
Hispanic origin 0.174 0.156  0.113 0.112 
Age 33.5 34.4  38.8 40.4 
Employed 0.511 0.629  0.702 0.640 
Education      
< High school degree 0.381 0.328  0.283 0.264 
High school graduate 0.619 0.672  0.717 0.736 
N 9,615 7,040  11,104 8,081 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of SIPP. All estimates are weighted. 
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Table 2  UI Program Participation and Eligibility of Low-Educated Single Women, Ages 
22–55 
 
Proportions (standard errors) 
Year 
Mothers 
 
(1) 
Childless 
women 
(2) 
Difference 
(1 – 2) 
(3) 
UI participation, single women entering unemployment 
Prereform period (1990–1994) 0.287 
(0.017) 
0.314 
(0.018) 
–0.027 
(0.025) 
Reform period (1996–1999) 0.171* 
(0.017) 
0.209* 
(0.020) 
-–0.038 
(0.026) 
Postreform period (2001–2005) 0.214* 
(0.018) 
0.255* 
(0.020) 
–0.041 
(0.027) 
Monetary eligibility for UI, single women entering unemployment 
Prereform period (1990–1994) 0.715 
(0.021) 
0.842 
(0.015) 
–0.127 
(0.026) 
Reform period (1996–1999) 0.730 
(0.023) 
0.855 
(0.021) 
–0.125 
(0.031) 
Postreform period (2001–2005) 0.769* 
(0.019) 
0.826 
(0.020) 
–0.057* 
(0.028) 
Nonmonetary eligibility for UI, single women entering unemployment 
Prereform period (1990–1994) 0.400 
(0.025) 
0.455 
(0.024) 
–0.055 
(0.035) 
Reform period (1996–1999) 0.341* 
(0.025) 
0.346* 
(0.030) 
–0.005 
(0.039) 
Postreform period (2001–2005) 0.387 
(0.023) 
0.361* 
(0.027) 
+0.026* 
(0.035) 
Amount of UI benefit receipt, conditional on any (1996 $) 
Prereform period (1990–1994) $516 
(22) 
$537 
(20) 
–$21 
(30) 
Reform period (1996–1999) 461 
(29) 
495 
(68) 
–34 
(74) 
Postreform period (2001–2005) 504 
(31) 
593 
(45) 
–89 
(55) 
NOTE:  *Statistically significantly different from same-column estimate for 1990–1994 by 0.05 
level or greater.  Standard errors clustered by state. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the 1990–2004 SIPP panels.  
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Table 3  OLS Models: Public Program Participation and Eligibility of Low-Educated 
Single Women, Ages 22–55  (standard errors) 
 
UI benefit 
receipt 
(1) 
Monetary 
eligibility 
(2) 
Nonmonetary 
eligibility 
(3) 
UI benefit 
amount, if 
received 
(4) 
Participation in 
UI, TANF, or 
FSP 
(5) 
Single mother * prereform 
(1990–1994) 
–0.00382 
(0.0249) 
–0.122*** 
(0.0248) 
–0.0317 
(0.0346) 
10.90 
(33.92) 
0.250*** 
(0.0312) 
Single mother * reform 
(1996–1999) 
0.0172 
(0.0263) 
–0.0900*** 
(0.0296) 
0.0496 
(0.0389) 
–4.487 
(72.59) 
0.286*** 
(0.0300) 
Single mother * postreform 
(2001–2005) 
–0.0120 
(0.0269) 
–0.0429 
(0.0283) 
0.0592 
(0.0368) 
–39.13 
(57.22) 
0.246*** 
(0.0267) 
P-value from tests of linear restriction: Ho: Singlemom * pre – Singlemom * post = 0 
 0.818 0.03** 0.063* 0.310 0.916 
Other variables      
Age      
22–30 --- --- --- --- --- 
31–40 0.111*** 
(0.0189) 
0.0599*** 
(0.0200) 
0.0466* 
(0.0261) 
3.656 
(31.67) 
0.0401** 
(0.0193) 
41–50 0.127*** 
(0.0245) 
0.0725*** 
(0.0219) 
0.0878*** 
(0.0317) 
74.65* 
(40.06) 
0.0577** 
(0.0233) 
51–55 0.200*** 
(0.0382) 
0.0667** 
(0.0289) 
0.227*** 
(0.0509) 
–5.095 
(49.48) 
0.105*** 
(0.0335) 
Race      
White --- --- --- --- --- 
Black 0.00681 
(0.0187) 
–0.0607*** 
(0.0205) 
–0.00455 
(0.0268) 
–57.59 
(42.68) 
0.188*** 
(0.0259) 
Other 0.00284 
(0.0465) 
–0.0263 
(0.0415) 
0.0708 
(0.0562) 
–34.72 
(49.35) 
0.0284 
(0.0449) 
Hispanic origin 0.0326 
(0.0263) 
0.0128 
(0.0258) 
0.0827** 
(0.0378) 
12.28 
(32.57) 
0.0276 
(0.0253) 
High school graduate 0.0520*** 
(0.0169) 
0.0645*** 
(0.0174) 
–0.0129 
(0.0224) 
12.87 
(25.54) 
–0.0371** 
(0.0175) 
Marital status      
Never married ---  --- --- --- 
Widowed 0.0112 
(0.0444) 
0.00887 
(0.0378) 
0.0585 
(0.0578) 
–107.2** 
(49.52) 
–0.0732 
(0.0525) 
Divorced 0.0233 
(0.0204) 
0.0432** 
(0.0183) 
0.00149 
(0.0276) 
–63.56** 
(27.70) 
–0.000720 
(0.0257) 
Separated –0.0279 
(0.0245) 
0.00887 
(0.0378) 
–0.0186 
(0.0336) 
–59.75 
(39.59) 
0.0123 
(0.0287) 
MSA resident –0.0546** 
(0.0220) 
0.0296 
(0.0232) 
–0.0136 
(0.0295) 
109.0*** 
(26.79) 
–0.0583** 
(0.0231) 
Current student –0.0482 
(0.0298) 
–0.0376 
(0.0393) 
–0.0731 
(0.0468) 
48.80 
(60.13) 
0.00215 
(0.0367) 
Union member 0.0814** 
(0.0399) 
0.0528* 
(0.0321) 
0.0480 
(0.0467) 
38.55 
(50.68) 
0.0918** 
(0.0396) 
Table 3  (Continued) 
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UI benefit 
receipt 
(1) 
Monetary 
eligibility 
(2) 
Nonmonetary 
eligibility 
(3) 
UI benefit 
amount, if 
received 
(4) 
Participation in 
UI, TANF, or 
FSP 
(5) 
State-month 
unemployment rate 
0.0205** 
(0.00873) 
0.00374 
(0.00910) 
0.0152 
(0.0119) 
–29.72** 
(13.38) 
0.0262*** 
(0.00799) 
Time period      
Prereform period ---  --- --- --- 
Reform period –0.0685** 
(0.0325) 
0.0106 
(0.0317) 
–0.0801* 
(0.0440) 
–110.5 
(69.35) 
–0.0398 
(0.0362) 
Postreform period –0.0343 
(0.0293) 
–0.0209 
(0.0283) 
–0.0848** 
(0.0388) 
1.063 
(47.15) 
–0.00693 
(0.0266) 
State fixed effects x x x x x 
Observations 4,412 3,396 2,853 1,071 4,412 
R-square 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.13 
NOTE: Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample restricted to single women, ages 22–55.  --- = data not 
available; blank = not applicable.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the 1990–2004 SIPP panels. 
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